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Lawyers generally think of procedural law as the immuta-
ble backdrop against which they practice. Composed of an
amalgam of constitutional, statutory, and administrative provi-
sions, procedure is not as amenable to change as is the com-
mon law. Further, for those who think that, in theory, rules of
procedure should be outcome neutral, the extent to which sub-
stance is, in fact, modulated by process can be hard to appreci-
ate. In recent years, however, these perceptions have begun to
change. Dan Quayle, for example, expressly linked the United
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States' problems with competing globally to the unwieldiness
of its litigation system.' Dissatisfaction with outcomes also has
led many jurisdictions to undertake the difficult project of
reviewing process.2 Some places have adopted a trans-substan-
tive approach: that is, they have instituted reforms that affect
all disputes, regardless of their substantive content.
Other jurisdictions have, however, taken the opposite tack
and targeted procedural reform efforts to specific substantive
areas, especially to fields intimately tied to the economy such
as corporate and business law. One result has been that sever-
al states are moving to emulate Delaware, the one state that
has taken substance-specific procedure to the extreme: it main-
tains a special forum to resolve corporate governance disputes.
Given Delaware's success in attracting incorporations,
3
the esteem in which many commentators hold Delaware corpo-
rate law,4 and that, in part, these successes are attributed to
its special tribunal,5 other states have followed Delaware's
propitious lead. Pennsylvania is about to establish a special-
' David Margolick, Address by Quayle on Justice Proposals Irks Bars Associa-
tion, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1991, at Al ("compared with less litigous countries, the
United States is handicapped in world markets"); Alesaandra Stanley, The 1992
Campaign: Issues-Tort Reform; Selling Voters on Bush, As Nemesis of Lawyers,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1992, at Al ("excessive litigation had forced up the cost of
insurance, which in turn had forced up the costs of goods and services, causing
the United States to lose its competitive edge with other industrialized countries")
2 See, e.g., Saundra Torry, Quayle and Bush Administration Take on Civil Jus-
tice Reform, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1992, at F5. Max Boot, Chorus of Reformers
Adds New Pitch, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 25, 1994, at 12. The federal
courts, for example, were studied by a special congressional committee. See FED-
ERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURT STUDY COMmIT-
TEE (1990). For the most part, the important changes later made in federal proce-
dure apply to every case.
' Delaware is home to half of the publicly traded Fortune 500 companies and
to more than 40% of all companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Leo
Herzel & Laura D. Richman, Foreword to R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A.
FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS,
at F-i (2d ed. 1990); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435,
1443 (1992).
' See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited. Reflections
on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913,
919-20 (1982); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 258 (1977).
' See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorpora-
tion Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 280 (1985).
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ized court for adjudicating commercial and corporate disputes;6
New York is in the midst of an experiment with a specialized
Part for commercial and corporate matters;7 and California is
closely studying the matter of specializing the adjudication of
business cases.8 Indeed, even Delaware may expand the scope
of its specialized adjudication: a pending bill would establish a
new tribunal with broader adjudicatory authority over business
matters.9
This Article addresses substance-specific strategies by
examining the trend toward adjudicating business disputes in
a specialized tribunal.'0 Part I briefly describes the Delaware
Chancery Court and the court proposed in pending Pennsylva-
nia legislation. Delaware's preeminence in corporate matters
makes its court the standard by which to judge all other such
courts and Pennsylvania is well enough along in the process of
creating a new court to provide a concrete context within
which to consider the issues that specialization raises for busi-
ness law. Part II builds on the scholarly research in the area of
specialized adjudication," as well as my own work on special-
6 See, e.g., Pa. S. 309, 178th Gentl Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Feb. 7, 1994).
" See, eg., Gary Spencer, Cuomo Seeks State Commercial Court, N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 6, 1994, at 1.
' See, e.g., Cal. S. 1797 § 5, 137th Gen'l Assemb., Reg. Sess. (1993-94).
9 S.J. Res. 28, 2d Sess., available in LES, Del Library, Detext file (Feb. 4,
1994).
10 I have commented elsewhere on some of the trans-substantive reforms made
in federal law following the work of the Federal Courts Study Committee, see, eg.,
Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The What and Why of the New Discovery Rules, 46 FLA. L.
REV. 9 (1994); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Debate Over § 1367: Defining the Power
to Define Federal Judicial Power, 41 EMORY L.J. 13 (1992).
" See generally ABA STANDING COMILL ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS,
THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS: REEXAINIG STRUCTURE AND PROCESS
AFTER A CENTURY OF GROWTH 10-24 (1989); RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985); see also PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL, JUSTICE
ON APPEAL (1976); COAMHSSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE
SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMIENDATIONS FOR CHANGE,
reprinted in 67 F.RID. 195 (1975); David F. Cavers, Law and Science: Some Points
of Confrontation, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ROLE OF SCIENCE 5 (Harry W. Jones
ed., 1966); Ellen 1R. Jordan, Speeialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 745
(1981); Daniel J. Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution Through
Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 471 (1983); Richard Pa3ner,
Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984: An Essay on Delegation
and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 761 (1983); Simon
Rifldnd, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judi-
ciary, 37 A-B.A. J. 425 (1951).
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ized courts established under Article III of the Constitution, 12
to create a framework for analyzing the current trend. Part II
then applies this framework to demonstrate why Delaware's
special forum works so well. Part III proceeds to the actual
analysis of the future for these forums, considering whether
Delaware's success is transferrable-first, to other states, and
second, to fields other than corporate governance. Part IV looks
at the somewhat different question of the effect that interstate
competition in specialized commercial adjudication will have
on the substance of business law and on the ability of other
states to mirror Delaware's success.
On the question of the role that these new forums will
play in the future, my conclusions are not, on the whole, par-
ticularly optimistic. Delaware's success is partly due to its
being the first mover in the field of specialized business adjudi-
cation, and to its very special history, homogeneous population,
and unique finances. Unless they are able to duplicate these
factors, other states will not be able to capture the benefits of
specialization as easily as Delaware. Moreover, success in
adjudication tends to be field-dependent: corporate law has
many of the features that make for good results; commercial
law has significantly fewer. Thus, since most proposals aim to
specialize both commercial and corporate cases, they may not,
ultimately, make as large a contribution to business law and
dispute resolution as their proponents expect. Finally, consid-
erable danger exists that states, in their desire to compete
successfully with Delaware (and each other) will favor the
interests of the businesses that litigate before the specialized
tribunals over the interests of the unseen entities affected by
their decisions: consumers, suppliers, competitors, employees,
investors, and the environment.
12 U.S. CONST., art. III; Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REV. 377; Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Case Study].
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I. SPECIALIZED BuSINESS COURTS: DELAWARE AND
PENNSYLVANIA
Arguments both advocating and criticizing specialization
have been well rehearsed. 3 For the most part, however, these
arguments are made in the abstract, with little attention given
to the extent to which context affects a specialized bench's
ability to function effectively. Rather than fall prey to the same
vice, this paper takes a comparative approach. As noted above,
Delaware's Chancery Court is renowned for its contributions to
the corporate area, in terms of both the quality of law it has
created and its efficiency in resolving disputes. A comparison
of Pennsylvania's current proposal to this court affords an
opportunity to study the phenomenon of specializing business
litigation without courting the dangers of abstraction.
A. Delaware's Chancery Court
Strict proceduralists will find it odd that Delaware's Chan-
cery Court is discussed in an article about specialized adjudica-
tion. Specialized courts usually are defined as forums of highly
limited jurisdiction to which all of the cases of a particular
type are channeled. Strictly speaking, Chancery Court does not
meet this definition. It does not hear all corporate cases that
arise in Delaware, nor is its docket exclusively dedicated to
corporate matters. It was not even established with specializa-
tion in mind. However, historical accident produced a court
that, in point of fact, does adjudicate Delaware cases raising
corporate governance issues. Because these cases take up a
significant portion of the court's time, Chancery's bench has
developed the expertise in corporate matters that is the hall-
mark of a specialized judiciary. Thus, Chancery can be under-
stood only through the lens of its history.
At the time of the American Revolution, the majority of
colonies had continued the English practice of maintaining two
sets of courts-one for cases at law and one for cases in equity.
The law courts were creatures of statute, where the writ sys-
tem, jury trials, and money damages were the norm. In con-
' See supra notes 11-12.
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trast, equity was dispensed by the Crown, whose representa-
tives heard argument and took evidence regarding claims for
equitable relief-specific performance, injunctions, rescission,
reformation, restitution, and administrative remedies-in cases
where legal relief was inadequate or unavailable. In most plac-
es, the latter system of courts were unpopular. The royal pre-
rogative that created these courts, the absence of a jury in
their decisionmaking, and the discretionary nature of their
authority, were thought to concentrate too much power in
government. Accordingly, most states quickly abolished these
courts, merging law and equity into a single tribunal. Conse-
quently, business cases, both corporate and commercial, came
to be heard in courts of general jurisdiction.14
Delaware's courts were unique in the colonies. Because the
Delaware law courts exercised equity jurisdiction during the
colonial period, equity was not a subject of controversy when
the Nation was founded. Lacking a citizenry hostile to equity,
Delaware was free to structure its judicial system from first
principles. Its 1792 Constitution expressly separated equity
jurisdiction from common law jurisdiction, created a Chancel-
lor, and vested in him the power to hold Courts of Chancery
around the state." Chancery's acceptance by the population
was established quickly through the State's choices of early
chancellors. The first was William Killen, whose service during
the Revolutionary War and as Chief Justice under Delaware's
previous constitution helped to establish Chancery's credibility.
The second Chancellor, Nicholas Ridgely, quickly realized the
importance of regulating the court's procedure and integrating
it into Delaware's judicial system. His successors continued in
this work, keeping the rules of equity current with the proce-
dural theories of the times. With a small population that could
be administered to easily by a single equity court, Chancery's
position as the appropriate court for disputes requiring equita-
ble relief was never challenged.
Today, Chancery's history continues to define its power. Its
1' This history is drawn from William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short
History of the Delaware Court of Chancery-1792-1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819
(1993). See also William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of
Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 BUs. LAW. 351
(1992).
DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. VI, § 14 (1792).
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caseload includes cases involving trusts and estates, fiduciary
duties, guardianships, and civil rights actions seeking only
injunctive relief. Corporate governance cases also comprise
part of this docket. These cases appear on Chancery's docket,
however, not because the Delaware Legislature carved out this
jurisdiction, but because these cases generally raise the kinds
of questions with which equity deals: the duty of disclosure,
the duty of good faith, and the like. Moreover, corporate cases
often involve demands for the kind of relief-accountings, ap-
pointments of receivers, and orders to transfer corporate
shares-that were traditionally available only at equity. Final-
ly, because Delaware procedure treats class actions and share-
holder derivative actions as equitable in nature, Chancery
Court hears all corporate cases structured along those lines.
The foregoing is not to say that Chancery has remained
static since the time of the Revolution. Among other changes,
the bench was enlarged several times, and currently seats five
members. Since 1951, Chancery opinions are reviewed by the
same court that reviews law cases, the Supreme Court of Dela-
ware. Furthermore, cases like Harman u. Masoneilan
International,6 have expanded Chancery's powers to award
monetary damages, so that the court can provide all the relief
required to resolve corporate disputes fully.
But it is important to emphasize what has not changed.
High-quality jurists continue to sit on Chancerys bench and
have continued, in the Killen tradition, to move between the
courts of law and equity. For example, several chancellors,
including Daniel Wolcott, Howard Bramhall, and Joseph Walsh
16 442 A.2d 487 (Del. 1982). Harman involved a claim for breach of fiduciary
duties by majority shareholders that was brought under circumstances in which
rescission was not an available remedy. Despite the fact that this equitable form
of relief could not be granted, the Supreme Court upheld Chancery's jurisdiction.
First, it held that the exclusivity of equity subject matter jurisdiction depends on
the nature of the claim, not on the relief sought, id. at 498. Second, the court
found that even if the claim fell within the concurrent jurisdiction of law and
equity courts, the case should be heard by Chancery because the remedy at law
was inadequate: the action at law requires proof of scienter, the damages would
be limited to those directly or proximately resulting from the wrongful act, and
the plaintiff could sue only as an individual In contrast, equitable actions measure
the defendant's conduct against a fiduciary standard, the damages awarded repre-
sent the monetary equivalent of rescission, and the availability of the class action




moved from Chancery to the Delaware Supreme Court; Wil-
1Ham Duffy, Joseph Walsh, and William Chandler transferred
from the Superior Court to Chancery; and Collins Seitz was
elevated from Chancery to the United States Courts of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. And, of course, the chancellors and vice
chancellors continue to decide all Delaware cases seeking equi-
ty. Indeed, to many, the court's finest hour was not a landmark
corporate law case such as Ringling v. Ringling Brothers-
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc.,7 or a multi-million
dollar merger case, such as In re R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc. Share-
holders Litigation,8 but rather, Belton v. Gebhart,9 where
Chancellor Seitz held the segregated education of black school-
children unconstitutional."
B. Pennsylvania's "Chancery Court"
Pennsylvania's business court is at the opposite end of the
development spectrum from Delaware's: so far, it exists only in
legislative proposals. But lacking the tradition of Delaware's
Chancery Court can be an advantage. It gives Pennsylvania
the freedom to craft a new tribunal that precisely meets the
needs of business. At the same time, however, the absence of
an historical pedigree means that Pennsylvania must take
affirmative steps to establish this new tribunal's credibility.
The proponents of the Pennsylvania legislation intend the
state's Chancery Court to be a truly specialized forum. Its
subject matter jurisdiction is defined so that the court can
focus on business disputes and move them through the adjudi-
cation system rapidly. Criminal cases, which take up a large
share of most general court dockets and require priority han-
dling, are, therefore, expressly excluded.2' Also excluded are
all "nonbusiness claims,"22 such as civil tort cases involving
natural parties, civil matters involving occupational health and
17 49 A.2d 603 (Del. Ch. 1946).
18 No. CIVA. 10,389, 1989 WL 7036 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989).
", 87 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch.), affd, 91 A.2d 137 (Del. Super. Ct. 1952).
2 It is noteworthy that Belton was the only case heard with Brown v. Board
of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), that the United States Supreme Court affirmed.
21 Pa. S. 309, supra note 6, § 20(b). The one exception is criminal contempt
cases.
' Pa. S. 309, supra note 6, at Joint Resolution Preamble.
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safety, labor relations, and workers' compensation, and cases
in which consumers are indispensable parties.' Instead, the
court will use the docket time that Delaware expends on
noncorporate equity cases to resolve a broader range of busi-
ness disputes. The court's affirmative jurisdiction is defined as
"all cases involving corporations and other associations, mer-
cantile and commercial matters or the employment of directors
and officers of corporations and other associations. 4 In other
words, the court will be the forum for all commercial and cor-
porate litigation, both in law and in equity.
The court's specialized jurisdiction will be bolstered by
procedural rules tailored to its litigants' needs. Judges (chan-
cellors) must be "recognized experts" or "have at least ten
years' substantial experience in the practice or teaching" of one
of the court's subject areas; and no more than a majority of
the judges can be from the same political party.'3 The court
will be supervised by an "independent governing authority,'
authorized to order deviations from general rules of practice or
procedure.'
The law itself embodies two such deviations. First, jury
trials will be abolished except in "cases of indirect criminal
contempt."29 Second, the proposal limits the extent to which
generalist judges can undermine the expertise of the new court
by separating the new tribunal into two divisions-one for
trials and the other for appeals.20 It is expected that, in most
cases, review will be limited to the specialist appellate bench.
That is, although the bill creates an opportunity to seek fur-
ther review in a generalist court-the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania-that opportunity is quite limited. The Supreme
Court is given only 90 days to act affirmatively on a review
petition.3
' Pa. S. 309, supra note 6, § 20(b).
2 Pa. S. 309, supra note 6, § 20; see also id. at Joint Resolution Preamble,
para. 2.
Pa. S. 309, supra note 6, § 19(c).
Pa. S. 309, supra note 6, § 19(c).
" The governing authority appears to be the Chancellor. Sec Pa. S. 308 §
1741, 178th Genl Assemb., Reg. Sess. (1993-94).
's Pa. S. 309, supra note 6, § 23(a), (d).
Pa. S. 309, supra note 6, § 23(c).
Pa. S. 309, supra note 6, § 19().
" Pa. S. 308, supra note 27, § 724(b).
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The court's administration will be somewhat complex. The
Governor will appoint judges with the advice and consent of
two-thirds of the Senate, from a list of candidates submitted by
a special Chancery-nominating Commission,"2 which will itself
be selected with a rather elaborate procedure.33 Judges will
hold office for approximately four years, and then will stand
for one retention election, after which they will hold office
subject to Pennsylvania's rules on retirement.34
To the extent possible, the court will be supported by its
users. Its operating and capital expenses will be paid from a
"Chancery Court Fund," which will receive all court fees as
well as surcharges upon "corporation and other association
filing fees received by the Commonwealth."35 These charges
will, however, be supplemented by legislative appropriations as
needed."6
Of course, strict proceduralists will find it just as odd to
call the specialized court proposed in Pennsylvania a
"Chancery Court" as to label Delaware's Chancery Court "spe-
cialized." After all, Pennsylvania's court is not, strictly speak-
ing, a chancery court, as it will hear cases at law as well as
cases in equity. Its name does indicate, however, that the court
will dispense largely with the sine qua non of law: the right to
a trial by jury. In all probability, the name was picked to glean
some of the respect accorded to Delaware's Chancery Court.
Whether this court will improve the adjudication of business
disputes remains to be seen.
32 Pa. S. 309, supra note 6, § 21.
" Pa. S. 309, supra note 6, § 21. Four commissioners would be appointed by
the Governor, two by the Supreme Court, two by the president pro tempore of the
Senate, two by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, two by the minority
leader of the Senate and two by the minority leader of the House. The Governor's
choices must be nonlawyers, and no more than two may be from the same politi-
cal party. There are similar sorts of constraints on the other appointments. As a
result, only about half of the other commissioners could be members of the Penn-
sylvania bar and they would be fairly evenly divided by political party. Appoint-
ment would be for a four year term and could be renewed once.
" Pa. S. 309, supra note 6, § 22.
" Pa. S. 309, supra note 6, § 23(f).
" Pa. S. 309, supra note 6, § 23(f).
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II. SPECIALIZED ADJUDICATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
Predicting whether proposals like the one before the Penn-
sylvania legislature will produce better courts or better quality
adjudication depends, of course, on what counts as a "good"
court or a "good" adjudication. One can measure the success of
a court in a variety of ways. Objective factors, such as the
court's docket-clearing rate, or the number of litigants choosing
the court rather than other tribunals with comparable adjudi-
catory authority form one standard. Subjective measures in-
clude the satisfaction that litigants express in the adjudication
they received, the regard with which the court is held among
lawyers, academics and judges; and the degree to which the
citizens of the jurisdiction and those who consume the law the
court administers accept the court's output.
In fact, very little empirical research has been conducted
on any of these factors, nor is there agreement on which are
most important. In two prior articles, however, an approach to
the problem was taken that may help predict the role these
business forums will play in the future. 7 These articles exam-
ined the history of all federal specialized courts established
under Article III of the Constitution with particular attention
paid to their decisions and to the views expressed-in both the
legal literature and the popular press-by those who were
affected by them. The output of the courts that reviewed these
decisions and applied them was also explored, as were the
contemporaneous comments of neutral observers. Courts of
short duration, such as the Commerce Court, were compared
with longer-lived tribunals, such as the so-called Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals ("TECA").' From these compari-
sons, three constellations of issues emerged as useful in pre-
dicting success. These criteria-the quality of decisionmaking,
efficiency, and the appearance of due process-explain why the
Delaware Chancery Court has performed so well.
See supra note 12.
Congress was so pleased with the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals
("TECA") that it allowed the "temporary" emergency to last for nearly two decades.
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A. Quality of Decisionmaking
Quality of decisionmaking encompasses three interrelated
concepts: accuracy, precision and coherence. "Accuracy" refers
to the extent to which the law produces the objectively correct
result. In all cases, this is the result that most fully reflects
the true facts of the events giving rise to the litigation.39 More
important for these purposes, however, it is the result that
best integrates the needs and circumstances of the litigants
with accepted public norms and social policy. Additionally, in
statutory cases, an accurate result is the result that most fully
reflects the thinking of the jurisdiction's legislature.
Accuracy is of obvious importance. If courts are flagrantly
inaccurate, the rule of law becomes a meaningless concept. To
the extent it would be governed at all, the populace would be
subject to the haphazard results of particular cases rather than
to legislative or judicial direction. Even subtle departures from
accuracy can impair the success of a judicial enterprise, be-
cause observers rely fairly heavily on accuracy when judging a
court. The Commerce Court, which was created in 1910 to
adjudicate disputes involving the railways, provides an apt
example. Its high reversal rate by the Supreme Court, when
coupled with its role in the controversial business of railway
regulation, led Congress to abolish it in 1913, a mere three
years after its creation.0
"Precision" is sometimes confused with accuracy because in
common parlance they are synonymous. As used here, howev-
er, precision refers to reproducibility-the extent to which the
court reaches the same result in equivalent cases. Precision is
significant because the law should treat equivalently situated
litigants alike. In addition, the law must be perceived as stable
and predictable so that people can conform their behavior to it.
Precise decisionmaking is also of value to the administration of
justice because, at least in theory, if parties can predict the
" Cf. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Determination of Liabil-
ity, 37 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1994) (formulating a test of accuracy in tort litigation).
' See Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 42 ADMIN. L.
REv. 329, 335-36 (1991); George E. Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court: A
Study in Institutional Weakness, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 238 (1964); Dreyfuss, Spe.
cialized Adjudication, supra note 12, at 393 n.60.
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outcome of disputes themselves, they will resort less frequently
to judicial intervention. Thus, while it is desirable for courts to
reach the right (accurate) result in every case, reaching repro-
ducible results across the array of cases a court hears is more
important in some respects.
To achieve precision, however, courts must sometimes
sacrifice accuracy to ease of application. The trade-off that is
made can affect a court's reputation. For instance, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the nation's
appellate court for patent cases, has been criticized for judging
the patentability of an invention with objective criteria that
have little to do with inventiveness.4' However, because these
criteria do make patentability decisions more precise the
court's reputation has, to many observers, been enhanced by
its decision to mandate their use.42
"Coherence" is the last parameter in the quality constella-
tion. Every branch of the law has themes, that is, a variety of
policies it seeks to further. Coherence refers to how the court
knits these strands together. Do they combine to further social
policy, or do they operate at cross purposes? Do new decisions
demonstrate continuity with prior law, or does the law veer in
unpredictable directions? Does it practice what Justice William
Brennan informally called "damage control": when the court
makes an important change, does the court follow the change
with a hard look at how the new rule works in practice? Does
the court manage to resolve the implementation problems that
develop?
Coherence, like accuracy and precision, is a rule-of-law
issue. But for those who utilize (rather than merely observe) a
court, coherence can be a more important measure than either
accuracy or precision. Utilizers tend to evaluate accuracy and
precision by whether they win or lose. Coherence, however,
reflects how a particular decision fits into a body of law. It
therefore can be assessed independently of outcome. Looking
again at the Federal Circuit, while many commentators ex-
press concern that the court overly protects patentees, its abili-
ty to articulate coherent patent policy, without doubt, has
41 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Patent Standards and Commercial Success: Eco-
nomic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL L. REV. 803 (1988).
42 See, e.g., Dreyfuss, Case Study, supra note 12, at 8-13.
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contributed significantly to its public acceptance.43
B. Efficiency
The second constellation of issues that measure the func-
tioning of a judicial system concern efficiency. Efficiency, like
quality of decisionmaking, is multi-faceted. To utilizers of the
system, timing is probably primary: can the court decide its
cases within the time frame the litigants require? The Emer-
gency Court of Appeals, established during the Second World
War to control prices and wages, in many respects, was an
inconvenient tribunal whose procedures teetered on the edge of
constitutionality.44 But the times demanded quick decisions,
and the court was counted a success because it disposed of its
cases rapidly.45
Sometimes, however, this ability to dispose of cases rapidly
is achieved at a price society may not be willing to pay. If
many judges are required to achieve this goal, the court then
will speak with many voices. The law can become occluded
with inconsistent decisions that breed yet more lawsuits. Thus,
a second measure of efficiency is the number of judges (and
judge-hours) required to handle the docket.
Similarly, if rapid decisionmaking is achieved by dividing
disputes into small units for easy adjudication, the system may
work well as measured by standard parameters such as the
median decision times and publication rates. But these rates
only reflect the clearing rate for the units, and not for the
dispute as a whole. For the parties, a decision to divide up the
dispute can be inconvenient, as it forces them to pursue sever-
al suits simultaneously, sometimes in different forums. Bifur-
cation can also breed opportunistic litigation strategies, such
as forum shopping and sharp pleading practices that produce
workload problem of their own. Thus, a third measure of effi-
ciency is the number of cases and issues that the structure of
the judicial system itself generates.
See Dreyfuss, Case Study, supra note 12, at 21-23.
" Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).




The final constellation of issues is one that can be called
due process, but is more accurately conceptualized as the per-
ception of due process. Thus, those who utilize a given judicial
system have a constitutional right to due process. Accordingly,
most of the features that the public looks at in assessing due
process are, indeed, coextensive with constitutional require-
ments. They include notice, a meaningful opportunity to be
heard, compulsory process, and a neutral adjudicator. In study-
ing what observers say about newly created courts, however, it
is clear that compliance, or the appearance of compliance with
constitutional norms is not always enough to allay public con-
cern.
In fact, serious questions are raised whenever a tribunal
utilizes novel procedures. One example is the International
Trade Commission.("ITCM), which has authority over certain
disputes that arise in connection with the importation of pat-
ented goods. Although its procedures provide all the process
that is considered constitutionally due, the United States has
been the target of complaints by importers under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") on the ground that
the ITC's procedures differed from those used by the district
courts. Ironically, the ITC's process was specially tailored to
the needs of importers. For example, because importers gener-
ally want decisions quickly, the ITC's rules of procedure put
cases on expedited schedules, limited discovery, and circum-
scribed the ability to assert counterclaims. The departure from
district court procedure, however, created a perception of bias.
Since the United States could not allay that perception, an
arbitration Panel created to resolve disputes pursuant to the
treaty found the United States in violation of the GATT.46
A little reflection reveals why the use of trans-substantive
procedure is so desirable. To that end, it is important to re-
member that not all those who are affected by a court's deci-
- GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE PANEL, REPORT ON SECTION
337 OF THE TARIFF ACT OF 1930 (1989). See generally USTR Presents Section 337
Amendments Needed for GATT Implementation, 48 PAT. TRADFMARK & COPYRIGHT
J. (BNA) 120 (1994).
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sions will experience the process directly. For these third par-
ties, systemic guarantees of fairness are essential and trans-
substantivity provides some assurance that the court hears
and considers all viewpoints. In contrast, when rules are sub-
stance-specific, there is cause to worry that the dispute resolu-
tion mechanism has become politicized, that its rules are a
product of concerted efforts by those special interest groups
that have the most resources.47 If the same rules apply to all
cases, then parochial interests seeking to alter procedure are
forced to contend with a wide array of opponents-opposition
can come from anyone affected by adjudication anywhere, in-
cluding courts of general jurisdiction. Absent some unique
circumstance, the rules that result from this broader give-and-
take are likely to be evenhanded. In short, a new tribunal
derives public acceptance from utilizing familiar procedures
but a red flag is raised whenever the trans-substantitive ap-
proach is abandoned.
D. Specialization in Delaware's Chancery Court
With these criteria laid out, it is fairly easy to understand
why specialized adjudication has been so controversial. What is
somewhat harder to explain is why Delaware's Chancery Court
has enjoyed sustained success. If each criterion is examined in
turn, however, the apparent anomaly can be explained easily.
1. Quality
In some ways, specialized courts do very well on this crite-
rion. Narrowing jurisdiction to a single field generally produces
a relatively small bench. Its judges see the same issues repeat-
edly and thus have both the time and the motivation to do the
research and thinking needed to resolve them accurately.48
'" Another example is the sustained suspicion leveled at the Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Courts, which were established, in part, so that special proce-
dures for handling matters of national security interest could be utilized. See, e.g.,
Tom Ricks, A Secret U.S. Court Where One Side Always Seems to Win, CHRISTIAN
Sc. MONITOR, May 21, 1982, at 1; Philip Taubman, Sons of the Black Chamber,
N.Y. TIISs, Sept. 19, 1982, § 7, at 9.
" Cf. Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking
System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111 (1990).
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The size of the tribunal also promotes collegiality; the judges
come to understand each other's views well enough to articu-
late the law with precision. Furthermore, since the judges see
the same issues crop up in many contexts, they have the capac-
ity to write law that is coherent and the luxury-and in-
sight-to do damage control.
At the same time, however, specialized courts function in
isolation, which impacts on quality in a negative way. Since all
cases in a single field are funnelled to that court, little oppor-
tunity exists to exchange theories, to debate positions with
other courts, or to compare how different rules work in prac-
tice. There is, in short, no opportunity for the percolation that
tests, refines, and improves new ideas. In addition, since spe-
cialization cuts the court off from other areas of the law, the
thinking of generalists will not often contribute to the special-
ized field's development. Such cross pollination among legal
theories is a significant source of change in the law; important
methods of reasoning sometimes emerge rather naturally in
one field, and can be applied meaningfully to other areas.49
Most disturbingly, a specialized court may become blind to
externalities. In an adversarial litigation system, it is the par-
ties who frame the issues. Those not participating in the litiga-
tion are not heard, regardless of whether they will be affected
by the outcome. In courts of general jurisdiction, this problem
is countered, in part, by judges' exposure to a fuller array of
cases. Parties not heard in one context appear in another,
giving the court a fairly broad perspective on how its
decisionmaking impacts on the citizenry. Lacking this perspec-
tive, a specialized court may not be fully cognizant of the sys-
tematic effects of its jurisprudence."
The Federal Circuit is an example of this problem. Anti-
trust law has long attracted the interest of a broad range of
"See, e.g., RIcHARD POSNER, ECONOMic ANALYSIS OF LAWi (2d ed. 1977) (dem-
onstrating expansion of economic analysis from antitrust law to other fields);
Charles F. Weiss, Sociobiology and the Law: The Biology of Altruism in the Court-
room of the Future, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1041 (1987) (use of sociobiology in trusts
and estates as well as other areas) (reviewing JOHN H. BECKSTRAM, SOCIOBIOLOGY
& THE LAW: THE BIOLOGY OF ALTRUISM, IN THE COURTROOM OF THE FuTURE
(1985)).
£0 Cf. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?,




economists. Fierce debates have developed over the proper
economic analysis of monopolization issues; these exchanges
have worked their way into the courtroom and influenced the
decisions of the courts of general jurisdiction. 1 But despite
the fact that economic analysis is equally pertinent to patent
law, the judges of the Federal Circuit (with some exceptions)
have displayed little inclination to keep abreast of develop-
ments in economic theory. Thus, although patent law is more
coherent than it once was, specialization has had the effect of
isolating its development.52
Judging from the academic literature, Delaware's Chan-
cery Court seems to have captured the benefits of specializa-
tion fully, without paying a high cost in terms of quality ero-
sion. A good demonstration of the benefits is derived from
comparing the New York Court of Appeals' opinion in Auer-
bach v. Bennett,53 with Chancery's Maldonado v. Flynn."
Both cases use the business judgment rule to keep the court
from second guessing a special litigation committee's decision
to terminate a derivative suit. But New York uses the rule like
a blunt instrument, treating each case as if it presented the
same sort of conflict. In contrast, Delaware has developed a
test aimed at distinguishing disabling conflicts of interest from
the conflicts inherent in every situation in which derivative
suits are dismissed. This nuanced approach, which ac-
knowledges the shareholders' interest in corporate claims and
recognizes the extent to which derivative actions undermine
the assumptions on which the business judgment rule is based,
is possible because of Chancery Court's exposure and because
of the logistics of deciding cases in Delaware. Chancery sees
enough corporate cases to have the time and the contextual
information needed to fully appreciate the assumptions and
operation of the business judgment rule. Of course, the New
11 RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONO-
MIST NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 152-71 (2d ed. 1980); ELEANOR M. FOX & LAV-
RENCE A. SULLIVAN, CASES AND MATERIAL ON ANTITRUST 3-11 (1989).
"' See, e.g., Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Medipart Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1173 (Fed. Cir.
1992).1 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
", 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch.), rev'd in part sub noma., Zapata Corp. v.




York Court of Appeals, although it is generalized, probably
sees enough corporate cases to do the same. But because the
New York court presides over a vastly understaffed system, it
has a major incentive to find ways of removing cases from its
docket. Auerbach does just that. Whether or not one agrees
that Maldonado's more nuanced approach is the better rule,
the judicial effort required to administer it means that this
approach can be adopted only by a court, like Chancery, that
has the luxury of docket space.
Similarly, the costs of specialization seem minimal in Del-
aware. Certain features of corporate law, and the manner in
which it is practiced may explain why. At least in Delaware,
corporate litigants (or, in shareholder derivative cases, their
attorneys) usually are matched evenly, and capable of mount-
ing sophisticated legal attacks. Thus, whatever the court lacks
in terms of percolation is often more than made up for in the
quality of the argument it hears. There is also a rich academic
literature on corporate governance issues that does not exist in
most other fields. Even a superficial examination of Delaware
Chancery decisions reveals how nicely this literature substi-
tutes for percolation and cross pollination. Indeed, Chancery
has not been subjected to the criticism-leveled at other spe-
cialized courts 5 -that it cites academic and theoretical litera-
ture too infrequently.
2. Efficiency
A similar analysis can be made with respect to efficiency.
When Congress was considering specializing patent law, Judge
Markey, who was to be the specialized tribunal's first Chief
Judge, testified. What he said was: "if I am doing brain sur-
gery every day, day in and day out, chances are very good that
I will do your brain surgery much quicker.., than someone
who does brain surgery once every couple of years."' It is not
clear that judges need to be brain surgeons. The sentiment,
"' See Harold Wegner, Whither Scholarly Writing in the Patent World, 1
DINWOODY Cm J. 7 (1993).
56 Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 1981: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Admin. of Justice, 97th Cong., 1st Ses3. 42-43




however, is surely correct: specialization can help judges work
more efficiently.
On the other hand, specialization also can produce ineffi-
ciencies. If the law becomes truly predictable and stable, often
one side will know that it will lose in the specialized tribunal,
and so has the incentive to structure the litigation so as to
bring it within the jurisdiction of a different court. The result
of forum shopping is satellite litigation on pleading and juris-
dictional issues. In its patent docket, at least in its early years,
more than 10% of the Federal Circuit's reported decisions were
devoted to these sorts of issues, that is, to the creation of what
can be called boundary law. The court thus spent substantial
time on issues that would not have existed, but for Congress's
decision to specialize patent law.57
Another source of inefficiency exists when a specialized
court is too narrowly focused on particular issues. In such in-
stances, standard measurements of docket-clearing rates re-
flect that the court is doing well. However, the parties cannot
resolve their dispute without litigating in several forums. The
result for the dispute can be delay, confusion, and loss of
rights. For instance, TECA, established during the economic
upheaval of the early 1970s to regulate prices, had what is
called "issue jurisdiction."58 To resolve a dispute that con-
tained price-regulating issues in it, the parties had to divide
their case between TECA and the regional circuits, with each
court deciding its portion of the case on its own timetable.
Since appellate jurisdiction is measured from entry of judg-
ment, 9 and it was not always clear when an appeal was ripe,
it was not unknown for parties to inadvertently lose the right
to appeal portions of their cases.60
Here once again, Delaware Chancery has succeeded nicely.
Its understanding of financial markets has enabled it to decide
questions in the time frame required by the fast-paced transac-
tions it regularly reviews. A recent instance is QVC's and
'7 Dreyfuss, Case Study, supra note 12, at 31 n.186.
" See, e.g., Coastal States Mktg., Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., 604
F.2d 179, 182 (2d Cir. 1979).
19 FED. R. APP. P. 4.
' See, e.g., United States v. Cooper, 482 F.2d 1393, 1399-1400 (Temp. Emer.
Ct. App. 1979). See generally, Note, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals, 64 MINN. L. REV. 1247 (1980).
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Viacom's tender offers for Paramount."' The case was briefed
in two and one half weeks, and Vice Chancellor Jacobs assimi-
lated over 400 pages of briefs in nine days.'
Despite the fact that demands for monetary relief are an
important element in many of the cases Chancery hears, and
that traditionally equity courts have had rather limited power
in this area, Delaware has also managed to avoid the TECA
problem of requiring parties to bifurcate their cases. Here, the
close attention that Delaware's chancellors and its Supreme
Court have paid to procedure becomes important. Because of
the flexibility of equity, Chancery's authority can be expanded
to ensure that litigants enjoy one-stop shopping.' Thus,
Chancery resolves disputes, not merely issues.
3. Due Process
The perception of due process is the area in which special-
ized courts most often break down. First, they inevitably devel-
op specialized procedures which, as noted above, is a red flag
to observers. Moreover, specialized courts present reason for
concern about politicization and bias. As an example, consider
judicial appointments. It is surely the case that special interest
groups would like to influence all judicial appointments. Lob-
bying for appointments to a court of general jurisdiction, how-
ever, is not cost-effective. First, no one judge will spend enough
time on any one set of issues to justify an expenditure of sig-
nificant resources. Second, any expenditure would be diluted
by the efforts of other groups interested in other portions of
the court's docket. But specialized courts are different: fewer
groups are concerned with these appointments. Moreover, if an
interest group manages to elevate someone to the bench, there
is the possibility (if not the actuality) of a payback in many
future cases. Thus, the fear of capture by the better-heeled
side.
Similarly, there are sometimes allegations that even if the
judges are chosen in a fair process, one side will be better situ-
1 See, e.g., QVC Network Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc., 635 A.2d
1245 (DeL Ch. 1993), affd, 637 A.2d 34 (DeL 1994).
62 Id. at 1246.
See, ag., Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l, 442 A.2d 487 (DeL 1982).
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ated to capture their hearts as they sit on the bench. Commen-
tators have long noted that, in general, repeat players have an
advantage over one-time litigants.' This problem is exacer-
bated on a specialized bench, where repeaters sometimes know
all of the judges, are well-acquainted with the eccentricities of
the court's local rules and specialized law, and are positioned
to find suitable vehicles for advocating changes in the law that
they deem appropriate. One-time litigants operate at a severe
disadvantage.
Once again, factors about corporate law and its practice
make the Delaware experience encouraging. Those interested
in appointments are sophisticated enough and wealthy enough
to balance out each others' lobbying and efforts.6" Thus, mini-
mal evidence of capture at the appointment stage exists. As to
capture while on the bench, the litigants are generally equal in
terms of their financing and the quality of their representation.
And, although many litigants are repeat players, they tend to
play both sides of an issue, depending on the dispute. Conse-
quently, their interests tend to be in quality per se, not in a
particular result. For example, a corporation making a tender
offer in one transaction may be fighting one in the next deal,
giving it little incentive to bias the judges in favor of one par-
ticular view on any issue of tender offer law.6
If the views of commentators like Ralph Winter, Frank
Easterbrook, and Daniel Fischel are believed, then Delaware's
success on this criterion also can be attributed, in part, to the
constraints under which corporate management is said to oper-
ate.67 These writers note that, although Delaware's apparent
" Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead. Speculation on the Limits
of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC. REV. 95 (1974).
"' Alternatively, they are all smart enough to save their money.
" This is not to say that undue influence and capture are not conceivable, only
that they are less likely in a court run like Delaware's Chancery Court than in
other specialized tribunals. In fact, although there has been no evidence of undue
influence on appointments to Delaware's Chancery Court, controversy has sur-
rounded a recent appointment to the Delaware Supreme Court. See The Controver-
sial Delaware Court Nomination: Did Skadden Arps Partners on the Nominating
Committee Use their Clout?, NA'L L.J., July 11, 1994, at A17; John Close, Corpo.
rate Control Alert, AM. L., July/Aug. 1994, at 23; Nicholas Varchaver, Justice De-
nied in Delaware, AM. L., July/Aug. 1994, at 23. The Delaware Supreme Court
also has a strong influence on Delaware corporate law. See infra text accompany-
ing note 81.
" See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare:
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desire to attract incorporations could lead it to write law espe-
cially favorable to those making incorporation decisions, the
state has not, in fact, always raced the other states to the
bottom in terms of shareholder-protective measures. Instead,
its substantive law is, in many ways, more solicitous of share-
holders than the laws of other states. These commentators
attribute this phenomenon to the fact that corporate managers'
strongest incentive is to attract the outside capital that enables
their businesses to expand.' In order to attract these invest-
ments, managers must put aside their own private interests
and instead lobby for laws (or choose to incorporate in states)
where the law promotes shareholder value.
If this proposition is true with regard to the substance of
corporate law, it should be equally true regarding procedure.
Unless shareholders believe they will receive due process in
Delaware courts, they will be reluctant to invest in Delaware
corporations. And since, as previously noted, observers need
more than the minimal requirements of due process to believe
a court is evenhanded, the incentives that motivate corporate
management to favor laws that promote shareholder value also




Under the criteria developed to determine the efficacy of a
judicial system-quality decisionmaking, efficiency, and ap-
pearance of due process-specializing corporate law works
well, at least for Delaware. To predict the future of specialized
Theories and Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540 (1984); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel 1, Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983); Fischel,
supra note 4, at 913; Winter, supra note 4, at 251.
' Easterbrook, supra note 67, at 545; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 67, at
403; Fischel, supra note 4 at 919; Winter, supra note 4 at 257.
3 Indeed, one demonstration of this effect is the rapidity with which Delaware
enacted law to assert jurisdiction over directors of Delaware corporations after the
U.S. Supreme Court invalidated its sequestration statute. See Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186 (1977); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 3114 (1977). Delaware's
new measure does not serve management particularly well (in fact, it enhances
their risk of liability), but it does provide a guarantee to shareholders that Dela-




dispute resolution in business cases it is next necessary to
determine whether the Delaware experience is portable: trans-
ferrable to other states and to other areas of the law.
A. Transfer of the Delaware Model to Other States
The question, then, is how likely is it that other states-or
more concretely, Pennsylvania-will duplicate the success
enjoyed by Delaware. The answer, once again, depends on
what is meant by success. Certainly, one reason states are
considering specialization is to meet their adjudicatory needs
more effectively. Accordingly, one measure of success is the one
just applied to Delaware-quality decisions, efficient adjudica-
tion and public perception of fairness.
It is, however, highly likely that states are making this
move for another reason as well: to capture a piece of the in-
corporation business that now flows so freely to Delaware.
Indeed, in the preamble to the bill that would create the Chan-
cery Court in Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth specifically re-
fers to improving its "economic climate."0 Presumably, legis-
lators expect that making the state's adjudicatory procedure
more attractive to those who make incorporation decisions, in-
state chartering will increase and Pennsylvania will earn some
of the incorporation fees and franchise taxes that currently
flow into the treasury of Delaware. Moreover, they may be
hoping that adjudication of such cases in Pennsylvania will
enhance the Commonwealth's influence on the substance of
corporate law, 1 and may even lead to an upsurge in business
"' PA. S.309, supra note 6 (Preamble). In the same vein, the Philadelphia Bar
Association's Chancellor-Elect Lawrence Beaser, in discussing the Pennsylvania
proposal, stated that "[a] specialized business court would encourage business ex-
pansion and development in Pennsylvania." Hank Grezlak, Beaser Sounds Call for
Court Reforms: Incoming Chancellor Also Pledges Support for Needy Children,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 3, 1993, at 1.
New York's experiments with a commercial court is couched in terms of pro-
viding expertise, reducing backlog, and ensuring consistency. But "keep[ing] New
York hospitable to business," Gary Spencer, Commercial Court Parts to Open in
Manhattan, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 14, 1992, at 1 (quoting Howard N. Lefkowitz of Pros-
kauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn), and "improv[ing] the business climate," Spencer,
supra note 7, at 1 (quoting Governor Mario Cuomo), also are considerations that
are mentioned.
71 Cf. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIREC-
TIONS 178 (1991) (describing the influence-building effect of forum shopping).
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for one of the most powerful lobbying groups on these mat-
ters-the Pennsylvania corporate bar.72 Thus, another mea-
sure of success is the degree to which a specialized court will
indeed attract new business.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to believe that Pennsylvania's
new forum will be a success on any of these terms, for Dela-
ware has advantages that no other state can ever enjoy. First,
there is the history of its Chancery Court. As a product of post-
Revolutionary War legislation, Delaware never removed corpo-
rate law from the mainstream of cases to give it special treat-
ment. As a consequence there was never a time when the spe-
cialized rules that Chancery uses came under scrutiny. Equity
courts, for example, never utilized jury trials, so that dispens-
ing with them even in cases like Harman v. Masoneilan
International,73 which involved monetary relief and therefore
would be tried to a jury in most states, is not remarkable for
Delaware. In contrast, Pennsylvania's removal of corporate and
commercial cases from the purview of the jury is bound to
create problems. Indeed, it is thought to be one of the reasons
the proposal has yet to be enacted. 4 Abolishing the jury flies
in the face of Pennsylvania's historical decision to merge equity
into law. Moreover, its substance-specific procedure generates
the kind of suspicions generally created by departures from
trans-substance. 5
The fact that Delaware's Chancery Court is not really
specialized also gives it important advantages. Procedurally,
the court can tailor its processes to the needs of corporate
I See Thomas A. Slowey, Pennsylvania Chancery Court is a Sound Proposal;
But Merit Selection and No Jury Trials Stand as Controversial Components, PA. L.
WKLY., May 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Palawj File.
s 442 A.2d 487 (Del. 1982).
' Slowey, supra note 72, at 9.
Significantly, in an earlier draft of the Pennsylvania legislation, the jury
would have been retained in cases involving sole proprietors subjected to compulso-
ry process. Pa. S. 308 § 814(b) (1), 176th Leg. (1993). Possibly, the drafters provid-
ed this exception because they thought that even if the public does not compre-
hend all of the problems associated with specialized adjudication, it would sympa-
thize with the poor merchant forced to defend in Pennsylvania without the benefit
of a jury of peers. The current version of the statute dispenses with this provi-
sion-probably because it would have required the kind of fine-line drawing that
generates satellite litigation and inefficiencies. But Pennsylvania cannot have it
both ways. To obtain efficiency, it must change procedure, even in sensitive areas.
However, changing procedure undermines the appearance of due process.
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cases without appearing to depart from trans-substantive law.
That.is, since the fluidity of equitable procedure applies to all
cases in Chancery, the court cannot be suspected of choosing
rules particularly felicitous to, say, the directors of Delaware
corporations. In addition, because the court entertains cases
outside the corporate area, citizens from all walks of life come
into regular contact with the tribunal. Since they can experi-
ence the evenhanded process directly, they do not need the sys-
temic guarantee of fairness that trans-substantivity provides.
From a substantive point of view, Chancery's noncorporate
jurisdiction cuts down on the court's isolation and facilitates
cross pollination. For example, the court encounters fiduciary
duty questions in a variety of contexts. Thus it can approach
corporate cases from a wider perspective. Moreover, Chancery
has the tools to keep corporate law doctrines in line with devel-
opments outside the corporate sphere. Cross pollination is
aided by the tradition in Delaware of jurists moving back and
forth between Chancery and courts of general jurisdiction. Not
only does this tradition provide a natural vehicle for cross
pollination, but it also has the effect of making new appoint-
ments significant to a broad constituency, thereby reducing the
influence of interest groups.76
Pennsylvania's legislation does not, in fact, ignore these
important ingredients to Delaware's success. But although its
attempts to duplicate them are interesting, they are likely to
be of limited utility. Procedurally, one way to enjoy the bene-
fits of tailored procedures without raising the red flag of sub-
stance-specificity is to give the litigants a choice between a
specialized forum and the courts of general jurisdiction. Fed-
eral tax law is administered on this model, and the right to
litigate internal revenue matters outside the Tax Court is said
to allay litigants' suspicions that the process is stacked in favor
of the government.77 Moreover, the willingness of taxpayers to
" Even so, some commentators have voiced concern regarding the public-re-
garding components of corporate law. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel
Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Toward Proxy Contests, 78 CAL.
L. REv. 1073 (1990); Stanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the
Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42
(1980).
7" Dreyfuss, Specialized Adjudication, supra note 12, at 436; see also Jordan,
supra note 11, at 752-54.
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use the special tribunal shows outsiders that those positioned
to know the court think its procedures are evenhanded. Pro-
viding this choice of forums does, however, have significant
costs. The state must support two courts that decide similar
issues; if the two do not perceive the law in the same way, the
inconsistencies that develop may undermine the quality objec-
tives of specialization. Furthermore, the side that expects to
lose in the specialty tribunal is likely to engage in inefficient
litigation strategies designed for forum shopping purposes.
Pennsylvania tries to capture the benefits of choice with-
out paying these costs by making Chancery's jurisdiction exclu-
sive,78 while simultaneously recognizing choice of forum claus-
es.7 The result is that, as in the Tax Court example, parties
can avoid the forum at relatively low cost. That they choose to
stay in the specialized court provides evidence that the court's
procedures are fair. But, unlike the Tax Court model, this
strategy allows the state to avoid the cost of maintaining two
courts to hear business cases. It also eliminates the problem of
inconsistent decisions, because the cases that are heard in
other courts may not be decided under Pennsylvania law at all,
or if Pennsylvania law is used, the court will apply it in a
nonprecedent-setting manner.
Admittedly, this is a truly clever approach to the due pro-
cess problem. It is not, however, a perfect solution. It applies
only to parties who are positioned to bargain for a choice of
forum clause, thereby leaving open the possibility that other
litigants will receive less process than is due. Moreover, the
power to opt out of Pennsylvania undermines the goal of at-
tracting more adjudication to the Commonwealth. Finally, this
solution does little to improve the quality of law or dispute
resolution within Pennsylvania.
On the substantive front, the State does, however, have
other ideas. First, the proposal's merit-appointment procedures
create high standards for chancellorships. The appointment
process is, however, very convoluted and rather costly. For
instance, the process for choosing the nominating commission
focuses rather heavily on balancing the party affiliation of
commissioners. Although this focus was probably aimed at
" See Pa. S. 308, supra note 27, § 832(d).
See, e.g., Pa. S. 308, supra note 27, § 302(b).
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achieving impartiality, the procedure appears to be extraordi-
narily political. More important, this complexity will
raise-indeed, already has raised-substantial questions about
the care with which the rest of the Pennsylvania judiciary is
chosen."0
The legislation's second attempt to improve substance is
more imaginative. By substituting commercial cases for the
part of the docket that Delaware devotes to non-corporate
equity cases, Pennsylvania will give its specialty court a broad-
er perspective on issues affecting corporations than Delaware's
Chancery Court enjoys. Since this part of the Pennsylvania
court's jurisdiction includes nongovernance issues, the ability
of managers to influence judicial appointments is substantially
diluted. But even here, problems may arise. To keep the dock-
et manageable (and perhaps to reduce the suspicions aroused
by abolishing jury trials), business cases that involve consum-
ers and workers are excluded from the court's jurisdiction. To
be sure, issues such as health and safety, labor relations, and
workers' compensation, are only tangentially related to the
commercial and corporate governance areas in which the court
is to develop expertise. However, removing these cases from
the docket means that the Court will not see the impact of its
decisions on real people. The quality of the common law it
produces may suffer as a result.
Delaware's history includes another feature that will be
difficult to duplicate. Delaware's quality of decisionmaking is
facilitated by the way that Chancery and the Supreme Court of
Delaware interact. In many other specialization contexts, re-
view by a court of general jurisdiction is a mixed blessing. On
the one hand, the generalist viewpoint provides an important
check on the special court's isolation. On the other, lacking the
knowledge the special court possesses, a generalist appellate
court can easily tamper with output in a way that destroys all
of the advantages of specialization. In Delaware, however, this
is not a serious problem. Because of the state's small size, and
because of the number of in-state corporations relative to that
size, corporate cases make up a large share of the Supreme
Court's docket as well. Its own expertise means that it usually
can appreciate all of the factors Chancery took into account in
" See Slowey, supra note 72.
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reaching its decisions. The Supreme Court's perspective may
lead it to a different conclusion, but at least it has fully consid-
ered the same questions.8 In contrast, Pennsylvania exacer-
bates the problem of specialization by establishing both a trial
and appellate specialized bench. This structure reduces the
leavening that comes from generalist input and enhances the
problems of capture. Moreover, circumscribing the role of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court can only lead to questions about
the quality of that tribunal. 2
Delaware has two advantages that go beyond its history:
its finances and population. Delaware is small and homoge-
neous; its revenue needs are modest. These factors make a
difference in whether other states can produce a law and adju-
dication package that will fulfill the goal of attracting new
incorporations and a difference in whether the citizens of these
states will see the court as benefitting themselves.'
First, there is the question of responsiveness. Delaware
has more than just statutes, case law, and judges that appeal
to those making incorporation decisions. It also has a legisla-
ture that responds quickly whenever incoherence develops or
exogenous circumstances interfere with the legislature's in-
tents with regard to corporations.' Surely, this ability to
move quickly must be a strong selling point to corporate man-
agers, who are aware that even carefully crafted laws may
require change as new circumstances arise.
Indeed, Delaware's legislature is more than simply respon-
sive-it seems to take a lively interest in producing a genuine-
ly functional product. Compare, for example, its antitakeover
statute with New York's." The latter is another blunt instru-
ment; Delaware, as usual, takes a nuanced approach, regulat-
ing only those offers that present structural problems. Com-
'1 See, e.g., Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366 (Del. 1992).
In Pennsylvania, this perception is enhanced by the fact that one of its Su-
preme Court justices was indicted for drug-related offenses while the proposal was
under discussion. See Slowey, supra note 72. Pennsylvania is not unique, however,
in having experienced this sort of problem with its judiciary.
See generally Herzel & Richman, supra note 3.
8 An example, once again, is the rapidity with which the legislature moved to
re-instate its intent to assert personal jurisdiction over directors of Delaware cor-
porations after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 US.
186 (1977). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114 (1977).
DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 203; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 912 (McKinney 1990).
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mentators posit that the incorporation fees and franchise taxes
explain the difference in approach. Their significance to
Delaware's revenue base keeps the legislative eye on the corpo-
rate ball.86 In contrast, most states-including Pennsylva-
nia-are too big for these effects to take hold. Franchise taxes
in these states will never be important enough to focus
legislators' attention on corporate law at a level anywhere near
Delaware's.
Second, intermeddling can be a problem. Because of its
size, Delaware does not have as many interest groups con-
cerned with the substantive content of its corporate law as
other states have. Pennsylvania, for example, has substantial
members of financial institutions, bondholders, shareholders,
corporate employees, and entities who contract with corpora-
tions to exert-or try to exert-influence on legislation. Admit-
tedly, some of these groups want the same things the corpora-
tions want. Others share the desire to increase state charter-
ing. But some interest groups prefer law that enhances their
substantive position, even if that reduces the number of in-
state incorporations. To the extent these groups are more effec-
tive in other states than they are in Delaware-and
Pennsylvania's anti-takeover law87 and tax laws 8 indicate
that they are very effective indeed-Delaware will always be
able to offer the package of law plus adjudication that is the
most desirable to corporations.
Third, for populous states, specialization raises difficult
allocation questions. Judicial resources are limited. Those used
to establish a specialized court must come from somewhere,
and that place is most likely the courts of general jurisdiction.
In Delaware, diversion of resources is not likely to be a prob-
lem. None of the courts is especially overworked, and besides,
Chancery's broad equity jurisdiction means that the entire
population of the state enjoys the benefits of a good Chancery
Court. In other states, this diversion of resources may not be
as acceptable. As between first-rate adjudication of corporate
In 1990, corporate franchise taxes and fees accounted for approximately 20%
of Delaware's general revenue funds. See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for
Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 885, 888 n.8 (1990).
87 PA. Bus. CORP. L. §§ 2551-2556 (1989 & Supp. 1992).




governance issues and removing drug dealers from the streets
quickly, few Pennsylvanians are likely to seek the deployment
of first-rate jurists' talents in the manner that Delaware has
chosen. Indeed, the Commonwealth's attempt to make the new
court user-supported is probably motivated, at least in part, by
this concern.'
Of course, Pennsylvania may not think of itself as divert-
ing resources. Rather, its legislators may believe that only
special courts will attract high caliber jurists; that the same
people would simply not serve on benches that see mainly drug
deals. They may also believe that the efficacy of the courts of
general jurisdiction will be enhanced if complex business mat-
ters were removed from their dockets. But even if these assess-
ments are correct, public perceptions count. Utilizing public
funds to exclusively support the interests of businesses and
corporations is not likely to be greeted with favor."
Delaware has a final edge worth noting-the advantage of
being the first mover. That is, as the first to establish a special
court that has, in turn, attracted in-state charters, it has more
to offer to corporations: more precedents, that resolve more
issues, and present more varied fact patterns than any other
state. Delaware law is, in short, unusually capable of excep-
tionally fine distinctions. Moreover, the continuity of the
court's positions from case to case and situation to situation
provides parties with an extraordinary ability to predict where
the court is moving.9 Professor Roberta Romano, among
See Pa. S. 308, supra note 27, § 23(f. This is also a problem for New York,
where the commercial court idea has already been attacked for its "negative im-
pact ... upon the 'prestige and resources' of the Supreme Court and its non-com-
mercial litigants." Martin Fox, Bar Report Urges Expansion Of Commercial Parts,
N.Y. L.J., July 20, 1994, at 1 (quoting a New York County Lawyers' Association
report).
-' See, e.g., Jennifer Thelan, Bar Gouernors Stay Neutral on Business Court
Legislation, AM. LAW., Mar. 1, 1994, at 2 (noting that legislation to experiment
with a specialized business court in Los Angeles was blocked because it would
have cost the State of California $2 million to fund).
,, An example here is the case law regarding the validity of anti-takeover
defenses. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637
A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140
(DeL 1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(DeL 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Cheff
v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (1964). Of course, beauty is in the eye of the beholder;,
some commentators may view these cases as articulating vague and inconsistent
standards. That possibility is the dangerous side of hearing many cases on similar
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many others, believes that precision, rather than accuracy or
any other factor, makes Delaware such an attractive place to
incorporate.2 It is doubtful that any other state could hope to
catch up.
B. Transfer of the Delaware Model to Other Fields
States attracted by the Delaware model have sought not
only to emulate it, but also to expand upon it. Thus,
Pennsylvania's decision to augment the court's adjudicatory
authority over corporate cases with a range of commercial
disputes is echoed in the proposals under consideration in both
California and New York. In a most interesting development,
even Delaware is considering the establishment of a hybrid
Chancery/Superior Court to expedite the resolution of major
commercial and business cases. 3 And so to the next question:
how portable is Delaware's success in specializing corporate
governance disputes to cases in other fields?
Here, it is possible to be somewhat more sanguine, for
commercial law and practice share many of the characteristics
that helped to explain the success of Delaware Chancery. Com-
mercial law is, like corporate law, an area where specialized
adjudication would be especially useful. Since most mercantile
decisions involve considerable planning, a stable body of clear
law is of particular value. Transactions occur quickly, and so
rapid decisionmaking is advantageous. Most important, many
legal issues depend on the customs of the trade.' Adjudicat-
ing these cases in a specialized court would obviate the need to
call a succession of expert witnesses and result in more accu-
rate decisionmaking.
Similarly, the costs of specialized commercial adjudication
would mirror the costs of specialized corporate adjudication.
Litigants in commercial cases are almost by definition solvent.
They are often evenly matched. Cases are argued by sophisti-
cated, repeat players, most of whom cannot predict the side of
an issue on which they will appear the next time around.
issues.
Romano, supra note 5, at 280.
S.J. Res. 28, supra note 9.
" See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-207 (1994).
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Thus, as with Delaware's corporate litigants, commercial par-
ties lack the incentive to sway judges in particular directions.
And because these cases almost always involve contractual
arrangements, they even have a systemic guarantee of fair-
ness: if the court were unfair, the parties would use choice of
forum clauses to opt out of the state's adjudicatory mecha-
nisms.
At the same time, however, there are reasons to be con-
cerned about the role that these courts will play in resolving
the business disputes of the future. For one, the match-ups in
commercial cases are not quite as even as in corporate cases.
For example, although Pennsylvania's legislation otherwise
excludes cases involving natural persons, it does include cases
involving "sole proprietors."95 Such litigants are not likely to
be as well financed and legally sophisticated as large commer-
cial enterprises. To make matters worse, these less well-posi-
tioned litigants are the ones most likely disadvantaged by the
elimination of jury trials.
There is also an important difference between the systemic
guarantees of fairness available in corporate cases and those
available in commercial cases. The ease with which the parties
can avoid the forum provides the public with assurance that
the litigants are treated fairly, but does not provide insurance
that the court will fairly consider the interests of nonparties.
After all, commercial players are not in competition for capital
investments in the way that corporate managers are, and
therefore do not need to be as concerned with public percep-
tions. Thus, there is little reason to expect that they will advo-
cate rules that are favorable to outsiders. Indeed, there is
reason to believe the opposite: recent scholarship has begun to
demonstrate that the Uniform Commercial Code has been
heavily influenced by the fact that merchants are routinely
asked to comment on drafts of new versions of the Code, while
consumers and other nonmerchants are excluded from the
codification process.9"
The move toward specializing commercial disputes may, in
See Pa. S. 308, supra note 27, § 20(b)(1).
Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the Uniform Laws




addition, have severe efficiency implications. First, there is the
issue of boundary disputes. Pennsylvania's commercial jurisdic-
tion provision is quite complicated. The policy is easy to under-
stand-the state is trying to limit the court to genuinely mer-
cantile claims and exclude claims involving individuals and
nonmerchant issues. However, to achieve that end, the juris-
diction provision has many exceptions, such as special rules for
cases in which individuals are indispensable parties. 97 Fur-
thermore, the law contains extensive transfer provisions.98
The statute also includes a rather unique provision that denies
the court's decisions res judicata effect in certain of these cir-
cumstances."5 The opportunities here for sharp pleading prac-
tice, forum shopping, and satellite litigation are vast. °0
Specializing commercial disputes raises a second efficiency
issue. Because of specialized courts' precision, which reduces
the demand for adjudicatory services, and their expertise,
which reduces the number of judge-hours required to meet the
demand, specialized courts are sometimes thought to pay for
themselves. This is not, however, likely to be the case for com-
mercial disputes. The problem here is on the supply side. If
specialized commercial courts turn out to be appealing, and if
they indeed clear their dockets quickly, then they will generate
a substantial amount of new business, for many of the cases
that currently go to arbitration will come back into the public
system.'0 '
Granted, returning private cases to the public fold has
some advantages. Critics of alternative dispute resolution
("ADR") have pointed out that extensive reliance on extra-judi-
9 See Pa. S. 309, supra note 6, § 20.
98 See Pa. S. 308, supra note 27, §§ 5412-5448.
' Pa. S. 308, supra note 27, § 837.
100 The New York experiment provides even further grounds for concern. Al-
though a final report on the experiment currently running in Manhattan is yet to
be written, the judges who sit on the court have been interviewed about their
experiences. Several were asked to describe the court's adjudicatory authority and,
discomfortingly, they did not respond consistently. Most distressing was Justice
Cahn, who said: "a commercial case is what I think it is." Gary Spencer, Commer-
cial Parts Praised at Bar Meeting, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 27, 1994, at 1.
101 The Pennsylvania legislation actually provides for arbitration of some dis-
putes. See Pa. S. 308, supra note 27, § 7362. Delaware's legislation, which has a
$1 million amount-in-controversy requirement, seems to be directed, at least in
part, at increasing the number of lucrative cases requiring Delaware lawyers. See
S.J. Res. 28, supra note 9.
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cial devices can lead to a deterioration of the law. Since arbi-
tration awards often are not published as reasoned decisions
and some are expressly made confidential, the rules of law
applied in these cases cannot be easily determined, scrutinized,
or applied to similarly situated litigants. Moreover, because
there is no public debate over awards, arbitrators receive little
feedback on how they are doing or on the effects of their deci-
sions on nonparties."2 If adjudication could be made attrac-
tive enough to reverse the popularity of arbitration, these prob-
lems would be diminished. They would not, however disappear.
As noted above, specialty courts share with arbitration the
problems of isolation and lack of percolation.
And then there is due process. Many of these proposals
call for highly truncated adjudication of mercantile claims. For
example, Delaware's plan, as proposed in May 1993 by the
Commission on Major Commercial Litigation Reform, is to
provide parties involved in major litigation-defined as exceed-
ing $1 million dollars in controversy-with the option of having
their cases decided by a member of a special panel of judges in
a summary procedure. This procedure would abrogate the jury-
trial right, even in money damage cases. Scheduling and dis-
covery would be expedited: parties would have limited periods
(30-50 days) in which to disclose witness lists and documents
to be relied on at trial, and to request other documents; deposi-
tions would have to be completed within 120 days of the filing
of the answer; and all discovery would be completed within 180
days of the filing of the last answer. No motions for summary
judgment would be allowed. Discovery would also be limited to
10 interrogatories per side and 10 requests to admit per party;
each side could take the deposition of only four nonparties. The
trial would also be truncated: parties could elect to forgo live
witnesses and to submit their arguments entirely in writing. If
live witnesses were used, the trial would be scheduled to begin
within 30-60 days from the close of discovery and would last no
more than a week: one day for opening and closing statements,
with four days for direct and cross examination, allocated
equally to both sides.
This plan is a major departure from trans-substantive
* See Edwards, supra note 50; Viliam N. Eskridge Jr., Metapracedure, 98
YALE L.J. 945, 959 (1989).
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process. Worryingly, the departure does appear clearly to bene-
fit one side, for the party that starts out with more information
and relies on technical legalistic arguments will find these
rules less disadvantageous. Now, Delaware plans to use this
process only when both sides consent. It can, however, be diffi-
cult at times to know when consent has been freely and know-
ingly given. 3 Furthermore, while Delaware plans to limit
use of this forum to controversies that involve more than $1
million, the high stakes at issue in such cases are not neces-
sarily a measure of legal sophistication.
In the final analysis, it is difficult to see the current crop
of proposals for specialized business courts as progress. Indeed,
the move toward creating specialized commercial courts that
dispense specialized commercial law is reminiscent of the Mid-
dle Ages, when the Law Merchant governed the legal relation-
ships of those engaged in commerce. 4 The development of
the Law Merchant was surely a major advance over the meth-
ods of dispute resolution that preceded it, but it could not en-
dure once society became complex and interdependent. Lord
Mansfield's achievement in folding the Law Merchant into the
body of general law should not be forgotten when considering
the current crop of proposals.' 5
IV. INTERSTATE COMPETITION
Predicting the effects of specialized tribunals requires
consideration of a final question. If states are, indeed, choosing
" An example is Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). See
generally Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of
Procedure, 25 CORNELL INTL L.J. 51 (1992). Cf. Judith Resnick, Judging Consent,
1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43 (criticizing consent decrees on many of the same
grounds noted here).
1. See generally LEON E. TRACKMAAN, THE LAW MERCHANT: THE EVOLUTION OF
COIWERCIAL LAW 1 (1983); Paul Lansing & Nina Miley, The Right to a Jury Trial
in Complex Commercial Litigation: A Comparative Law Perspective, 14 LOY. L.A.
INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 121 (1991).
1 I am indebted- to Professor Allen Kamp for pointing out that in at least one
draft the Uniform Sales Act included a special adjudicatory procedure for business
cases. See Conference of Comm'rs on Uniform State Laws, Revised Uniform Sales
Act §§ 59-59D (2d Draft 1941). The intent was to "get questions of mercantile
facts settled competently," with a "higher degree of safety and reckonability than
has been available in our law since Mansfield's jury." Id. at 252 (Introductory
Comment). Significantly, this proposal went nowhere.
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to establish specialized corporate and commercial courts as a
means for attracting commerce, or in-state incorporations, or
business for the bar, then the dynamics of the competition
among states for these benefits will affect substance and proce-
dure also. Thus, it is necessary to consider how the constella-
tions of quality, efficiency, and process will be influenced by
the desire of each state to take adjudicatory business away
from the others.
Efficiency can be disposed of easily. At least with regard to
corporate cases, efficiency is not a likely arena for competition.
Cases cannot be adjudicated any more efficiently than Dela-
ware is currently adjudicating them. Thus the only way states
could move their dockets more quickly, would be to compro-
mise on the due process or quality parameters.
A. Due Process
In some ways, competition on process would be a welcome
development. As noted earlier, much attention has lately been
paid to the ponderousness of American civil procedure. Experi-
menting with change has, however, proved to be difficult. Not
only are the vested interests of dominant groups hard to ig-
nore, there is always a suspicion that change will have unpre-
dictable, adverse consequences on the least powerful members
of society. But the proposals discussed in this Article stand on
a different footing. Because of the limits these proposals place
on adjudicatory authority, the entities affected will be, for the
most part, sophisticated, well-heeled, and positioned to protect
themselves through their own influence on the legislative pro-
cess. As a result, innovations can be made without fear that
they will impact unfairly on one particular side.
More important, the litigants in these actions have consid-
erable freedom of movement. They can use choice of forum
clauses and incorporation decisions to "buy" the tribunal that
best suits their needs at relatively low cost. The result is a
kind of market in adjudication services. As in other markets,
competition creates discipline and inspires the participants to
produce ever better products.'"5
11 Cf. Solimine, supra note 103, at 75 (making similar comments with regard
to forum-selection clauses in general).
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Two features of the pending proposals are particularly
indicative of the benefits that may emerge. First, all would
abolish jury trials for most cases. Civil jury trials have been
the subject of considerable debate in recent years. They tend to
take a long time and they impose heavy duties on the citizen-
ry. Additionally, there are concerns about jurors' ability to
reach accurate results, particularly in cases involving complex
facts, complex law, or especially sympathetic circumstances. In
fact, England abolished the civil jury, °7 and some states have
made modest attempts to follow suit in particular
circumstances.' 8 In the federal system, Congress occasionally
has structured rights of action in a manner that avoids jury
trials;0 9 litigants from time to time argue for the right to
bench trials;"0 and courts have become increasingly fastidi-
ous about withdrawing matters from the jury that are inap-
propriately decided there."' But despite this ferment, jury
trials are said to enjoy great popularity. For that reason, virtu-
ally no attempts have been made to overturn the Seventh
Amendment or analogous state constitutional rights.
In this context, a state's decision, in the face of competi-
tion in adjudicatory services, to abolish jury trials is extremely
significant. It means that the assumption of popular support
1" See Section 6(1) of the Administration of Justice Act (1933) (Miscellaneous
Provisions). The Act contains exceptions for charges of fraud and claims of libel,
slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction or breach of promise
of marriage.
"' For example, many states have curtailed jury trials in workmen's compen-
sation and no-fault insurance cases. See, e.g., Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592
(Mass. 1971) (no-fault insurance); Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E.
431 (1911) (workmen's compensation).
' See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev.
Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977) (upholding assignment of "public right" created by
the Occupational Safety and Health Act to adjudication by an administrative agen-
cy rather than a jury).
... The most popular argument for an exception to the right to a jury trial is
the so-called complexity exception. See, e.g., In re Financial Sec. Litigs., 609 F.2d
411 (9th Cir. 1979) (reversing lower court's refusal to hold jury trial on complexity
grounds); see also Patrick Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at
the Time of the Seventh Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43 (1980). But see Morris
S. Arnold, An Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil
Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1980) (no such exception).
. See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786
(1993) (raising the standard for admitting scientific evidence); Matsushita Elec.




for the jury may not be as strong as is generally thought. Dem-
onstrated satisfaction with specialized courts could serve as a
signal that the time has come to stop chipping away at jury
trial rights, and instead to attack the system at its roots.
The other interesting feature of these proposals is their
striking similarity to the recent changes in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Both Delaware's hybrid court and the new
federal rules impose limitations on discovery;" the New
York experiment shares with the new federal rules increased
reliance on early case conferences and judicial control."1
Once again, in the federal system, these changes are consid-
ered highly controversial. To the extent they can, many dis-
tricts have opted out."4 As with bench trials, the use of these
procedures by litigants who are well positioned to avoid them
may be the best way to demonstrate their value. In the end,
the proposed commercial and corporate courts may make their
most important mark by serving as laboratories that provide a
clear demonstration that particular innovations work and are
valued.1 1
5
Important caveats are, nonetheless, in order. The best
process for corporate and commercial litigants may not be
appropriate for everyone on whom the law impacts. As noted
above, there is an unsettling quality to a tribunal like
Pennsylvania's, which will hear commercial and corporate
cases but never see the consumers and employees who are
affected by its decisions. Admittedly, decisions involving these
interests will lack full res judicata effect."' But res judicata
is significant only if a judgment is collaterally attacked. Those
affected by the court's actions may not have the resources to
mount the appropriate challenges. More important, the legiti-
macy of a court depends on its judges accepting moral respon-
sibility for affecting genuine parties."7 Because these special
112 See FED. R. CWr. P. 30(a)(2)(A) (limiting parties to 10 depositions) and 33(a)
(25 interrogatories).
FED. R. CIrv. P. 16, 26(d), (f); Spencer, supra note 100, at 1.
' 9 CvIVL TRIAL MANUAL (BNA) 572 (1994).
u' Certainly, the United States will never follow Britain and abolish the civil
jury until people see that state cases are fairly tried even without juries.
116 See supra text accompanying note 99.
13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2d §
3529 (1984) (noting the legitimacy function served by justiciability doctrines such
as standing, mootness, and the ban on advisory opinions).
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res judicata rules limit the reach of the courts' decisions, they
undermine accountability and, ultimately, affect the reliability
of decisionmaking.
Also worrisome is the fact that the group best positioned
to affect procedural rules in any given jurisdiction is not made
up of litigants or third parties: it is the bar. Professors
Geoffery Miller and Jonathan Macey have, for example, shown
that the Delaware corporate bar has such heavy influence on
Delaware corporate law that it substantially dilutes corporate
management's efforts to create substantive law attractive to
shareholders."' If lawyer-leverage is a real phenomenon, it is
likely to be even more true of procedure than it is of substance.
Attorneys, after all, are affected more directly by procedure
than by substance, and consequently may have more interest
in influencing procedure. And because procedure is arcane, the
public is less likely to be aware of what lawyers' influence
accomplishes. If lawyers are also given the opportunity to fo-
rum shop and play jurisdictions off against one another, inter-
state competition for adjudication business could increase the




That leaves the question that is perhaps of greatest inter-
est to corporate and commercial litigants: the effect that the
... See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group
Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987). Two of the exam-
ples these authors give are Delaware's failure to require shareholders in derivative
suits to post a bond, and the ease with which corporate books can be inspected.
Id. at 511-12. Both rules tend to increase the number of cases that can be pur-
sued successfully in Delaware, which may enrich the bar at the possible expense
of corporate managers and shareholder values. Other commentators have also
noted the influence of the bar on Delaware law. See Bebchuk, supra note 3, at
1448-51; William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware,
83 YALE L.J. 663, 686-88 (1974); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of Corporate
Federalism: State Competition and the New Trend Toward De Facto Federal Mini-
mum Standards, 8 CARDOzO L. REV. 759, 763 (1987).
"' This is not to say that there would not be checks on the bar's ability to
create lawyer-favoring rules. As competition in the bar becomes more heated and
clients become more cost-conscious, lawyers who increase expenses will be
disfavored-as will states where the costs of adjudication are high. The bar's in-
centive will then be to lobby for streamlined procedure.
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move toward specialized adjudication will have on the substan-
tive content of commercial and corporate law. For corporate
law, it is, unfortunately, no easier to decide this question than
to determine how corporate law has been shaped by legislative
competition among the states. Much ink has been spilled on
the issue of whether corporate law is racing to the top or rac-
ing to the bottom, and this Article is not the place to review
the literature or to choose a particular side. What can be said,
however, is that the emergence of specialized corporate courts
is likely to pick up the pace at which this race is run. Those
who agree with Professor William Cary, and believe that state
competition for in-state chartering drives corporate law to the
bottom should, therefore, be particularly wary of these new
forums. Those on the Easterbrook-Fischel-Winter side of the
debate should see them as especially advantageous.
Of course, it can be argued that the debate on the legisla-
tive race is not apposite to the question of a judicial race, be-
cause the legislative debate is premised in part on the idea
that legislators are motivated to please those who make incor-
poration decisions. Since legislators are accountable to the
citizens of the state in a way that judges are not, it could be
said that there is no judicial "race" at all; judges do what is
right, not what is expedient for the state.
The distinction between judges and legislators is not, how-
ever, completely convincing. Judges live in their jurisdictions,
and so they too want a healthy treasury. Those who run for
retention election have some formal accountability to the
electorate.2 Judges also care about the success of the court
on which they sit. Since success is often measured by filings,
legislative overrulings, and funding, judges' actual incentives
can be aligned rather closely to those of legislators.12' Fur-
thermore, even if judges are insulated from popular pressure,
they may think the normatively correct way to decide open
questions is to be faithful to legislative intent, and to promote
the interests of the state. Since specialized courts are more
accurate-that is, they discern legislative intent and public
policy better than generalized courts-competitive specializa-
tion may push the law to the top-or, depending on view-
See, e.g., Cary, supra note 118, at 690.
See, eg., Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 1453 n.74.
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point-to the bottom, faster.
As to commercial law, even less can be said. Since all
states adhere to the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), 122
there is little legislative competition for the best mercantile
law, and so the question of interstate legislative competition
has not been debated in recent years. But the absence of legis-
lative competition does not necessarily coincide with an ab-
sence of judicial competition. The UCC requires judicial inter-
pretation. Besides, the Code does not control every mercantile
issue or dispute. A live question therefore remains as to the
direction in which the race in commercial law will be run.
At least two reasons support the belief that the judicial
race will be run to the bottom-that is, that it will tend to
increasingly favor business interests over the interests of those
affected by businesses, such as consumers, employees, and the
environment. First, there is the problem of isolation. Pennsyl-
vania, for example, has defined the jurisdiction of its Chancery
Court in a manner that specifically excludes the possibility
than any natural person will ever be heard as a party litigant.
Thus, no opportunity exists for the court to see the effects of
its adjudication outside the narrow context presented by the
litigants. Admittedly, the adversariness of the parties may
mean that one side or the other will act as a proxy for outside
interests. This will not, however, always be the case. As anti-
trust theory suggests, even diametrically opposed commercial
interests negotiating at arms length can reach outcomes that
create significant externalities." The dangers of imposing
costs on third parties are unlikely to be any lower in the con-
text of adjudication than in the context of negotiation, at least
when the forum for the adjudication is too isolated to appreci-
ate the nature or extent of spillover effects.
Second, and even more problematic, is the fact that the
court may, for reasons stated previously, decide cases in a way
that enhances economic opportunities within the state, favor-
ing in-state businesses as well as businesses that are best posi-
tioned to utilize choice of forum clauses. Of course, this analy-
" All 50 states have adopted at least parts of the UCC. See 1 U.LA., U.C.C.,
Pocket Part 1-2 (West 1994).
'23 See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR
WITH ITSELF 1 (1978).
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sis is basically the commercial variant of the classic race-to-
the-bottom position in the corporate literature. The difference
here, however, is that the counterarguments made by the top-
bound theorists do not exist in the commercial context. That is,
Easterbrook, Fischel, and their colleagues do not dispute that
corporate managers can influence law, or that they have inter-
ests contrary to the interest of shareholders. Instead, they
argue that management's strongest incentive is to attract new
capital, and that this interest requires them to lobby for laws
that increase shareholder value. But that element-the desire
to please third parties-is not usually present in commercial
litigation. For example, although merchants do have an inter-
est in attracting consumers, they do not fulfill that interest by
crafting good commercial law because no direct link between
this law and purchasing decisions exists. Similarly, if there
were full employment, commercial actors would be concerned
about creating law that attracts high quality employees, but
full employment has been rare in this century. Thus, in the
end, commercial actors have less of a reason to sacrifice pri-
vate values to the interests of others than do corporate manag-
ers.
Of course, it could be argued that any inclination to favor
in-staters would also surface in courts of general jurisdiction.
Certainly, claims have made that these courts might produce
product liability rules that favor in-state plaintiffs."' Because
such effects have not been materialized, perhaps there is no
danger here. On the other hand, competition occurs only when
it is clear to the players that there are choices worth making,
and then only if the litigants can control the forum in which
they appear. The advent of specialized tribunals highlights the
existence of alternatives, and the enforceability of choice of
forum clauses makes these alternatives viable. Thus, even if
there is no race now, one may begin when the dynamic of
choice takes hold.
11 See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, A Choice-of-Law Approach to Products-Lia-
bility Reform, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILrIy LAW 90 (Walter Olsen ed., 1988).
But see, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and State Competition in the Product
Liability System, 80 GEO. L.J. 617 (1992) (concluding that, at least in states with
manufacturing, there are offsetting incentives). See also Gillian K. Hadfield, Bias




The success of Delaware's Chancery Court--or perhaps
loudly voiced dissatisfaction with the litigiousness of American
society-has brought new legislative attention to adjudicatory
mechanisms. This opportunity for procedural innovation is
extremely welcome, if not long overdue. However, the propos-
als currently under consideration have not been fully thought
out. The success of Delaware's Chancery Courts is largely the
product of Delaware's unique history and circumstances. More-
over, successful specialization in corporate law is partly the
product of the way that corporate law is practiced. Thus, the
portability of the Delaware corporate model to other contexts is
an open question. Interstate competition in specialized adjudi-
cation may add a new dimension to the problem. The race to
improve adjudication and to enhance economic opportunities
may, as in corporate statutory law, be to the top. But the
downside risk should not be ignored.
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